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CASE COMMENT: Pouncey v.
State-Guilty and Insane

I

n Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 264,
465 A.2d 475 (1983), the Court
of Appeals held that a defendant in
a criminal case could be found both
guilty of a crime and insane at the time of
its commission. In so holding, the Court
determined that an insanity verdiet does
not necessarily defeat the element of
criminal intent.
To reach a verdiet of guilty, the demands of due process require that the
prosecution prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant engaged in a
prohibited act (actus reus) and that the
defendant possessed the criminal intent
(mens rea) to commit such an act. In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970); see
generally, R. Perkins and R. Boyce,
Criminal Law 78-81 (3rd ed. 1982). T raditionally, a finding of insanity during
the commission of a crime would prevent
the rendering of a guilty verdiet because
it was deemed that the defendant, in being
insane, was incapable of forming the required criminal intent. See Bethea v.
United States, 365 A.2d 64, 72 n.15
(D.C. App. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
911 (1976).
In Pouncey, the defendant was charged
with the first degree murder of her five
year old son. She pleaded not guilty and
interposed the defense of insanity. The
evidence disclosed that the defendant
believed her son was pursued by the devil
and the only way to prevent her son from
going to hell was to kill him. The evidence further disclosed that the defendant had drowned her son and that she
was legally insane at the time the crime
was committed. The trial court found
the defendant guilty of first degree murder and legally insane at the time of the
offense. The defendant appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals, claiming that
the verdiets of guilty and insane were
mutually inconsistent and that she was
entitled to a verdiet of not guilty. The
Court of Appeals granted certiorari prior
to a decision by the Court of Special
Appeals.
In Pouncey, the Court of Appeals stated
that the insanity defense in Maryland was
defined by statute and court rule. Pouncey
v. State, 297 Md. at 266,465 A.2d at 476.
The Court noted that the Health-General
Code identifies the test for insanity and
responsibility for criminal conduct and
provides:
A defendant is not responsible for
criminal conduct if, at the time of
that conduct, the defendant, be14-The Law Forum/Fall, 1984

cause of mental retardation or a
mental disorder, lacks substantial
capacity:
( 1) 1'0 appreciate the criminality
of that conduct; or
(2) To conform that conduct to
the requirements of law."
MD. HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN. §12107 (1982).1
Having disclosed the statutory law,
the Court noted that the verdict of guilty
and insane was not without precedent in
Maryland. Four years earlier, under a
statute not different in substance from
the criminal responsibility test set out
above, the court in Langworthy v. State,
284 Md. 588,399 A.2d 578 (1979), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1979), "held that
a person found guilty of a crime charged,
yet successful in asserting an insanity defense, could appeal from the guilty verdiet." Id., as cited in Pouncey v. State, 297
Md. at 266-267, 465 A.2d at 477. The
court in Pouncey then concluded that,
"necessary to that determination was a
finding that a guilty verdiet is not inconsistent with a special verdiet of insanity."
Id., 297 Md. at 267,465 A.2d at 477.

Although the court in Langworthy was
concerned with determining whether the
verdiet of guilty and insane was a final
judgment and thus appealable, it did not
miss the opportunity to interpret the insanity statute then in effect. Without
pointing to any explicit legislative history
directed to the statute, the court in langworthy reasoned that since the Court of
Special Appeals had previously determined that the demands of due process
require a defendant be provided the opportunity to prove his innocence even
though the prosecution has accepted the
defendant's insanity plea, then the statutory scheme for insanity must contemplate that there first be a determination
of guilt or innocence followed by a determination of insanity. Langworthy v. State,
284 Md. at 598, 399 A.2d at 584; see also
case comment, A Defendant Found Guilty
But Insane May Appeal His Conviction:
continued on page 26
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III.
Concluding that Title VII would have
been violated had the defendants run the
entire deferred compensation plan
themselves, without participation by
insurance companies, the Court then
focused attention on the issue of
whether a Title VII violation has been
committed, given the fact it was the
insurance companies chosen by Arizona
to participate in the plan that calculated
and paid the retirement benefits.
The Court, for purposes of resolving
the issue, found it necessary to define
the limits of Title VII violations. In so
doing, the Court again finding strength
from its opinion in Manhart, found that
Title VII "primarily govern(s) relations
between employees and their employer,
not between employees and third
parties." Norris, 103 S.Ct. at 3499,
quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 718, n.
33. However, the Court in Manhart was
quick to point out that despite said
"relations" such a limitation would not
disallow an employer to set aside equal
retirement contributions for each employee and let each, upon retirement,
purchase benefits in the open market.
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717-18 (footnote
omitted).
The defendants seized this language
and argued they did not violate Title VII
because the annuity plans offered by the
companies participating in the Arizona
plan reflect those available in the open
market. Unfortunately, no relevance or
substance was found in this defense by
the Court; rather, it found that Arizona
did not simply set aside retirement
benefits and allow employees to purchase
annuities in the open market, but created
a plan whereby employees could obtain an annuity only if they invested
in a company specifically chosen by
Arizona. In essence, by requiring
employees to choose from companies
selected only by the state, Arizona
became a party to each annuity contract
entered into by one of its employees.
The Court then reiterated the well
established rule, that "both parties to a
discriminatory contract are liable for
any discriminatory provisions the contract contains, regardless of whieh party
initially suggested inclusion of the
discriminatory provisions." Norris, 103
S.Ct. at 3501-02, See Williams v. New
Orleans Steamship Ass'n., 673 F.2d 742,
750-51 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
_U.S._ (1983).
continued on page 24
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Langworthy v. State, 39 Md. L. Rev. 538,
540 (1980). Thus, one could first be
found guilty by the evidence presented
and then be found insane under the sta~
tutory scheme.
The rationale of the Langworthy court
is not convincing. The demands of due
process require that the prosecution
prove the element of mens rea before one
can be found guilty. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684(1975); Statev. Grady,
276 Md. 178,34 A.2d 436 (1975). In
the Court's opinion, there is little attempt
to reconcile the verdict of guilty and insanity with the prosecution's responsibility to prove guilt. Only at the very end
of the Langworthy opinion, within a
footnote, is such an attempt made.
We do not subscribe to the theory
of the Court of Special Appeals
that a finding that a defendant was
insane at the time of the commis~
sion of the crime means that [t]here
is no crime. Langworthy v. State, 39
Md. App. 559,561,387 A.2d634
(1978). Its reasoning was that the
finding of insanity establishes a
lack of mens rea. Id. We do not think
that this is so in light of the conditions prescribed for a finding of
insanity, namely "as a result of a
mental disorder, a defendant lacks
substantial capacity to either appreciate the criminality of his con~
duct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law." Code
(1957, 1972 Repl. Vol.) art 59,
25). Neither of these tests is [sic]
necessary at variance with a general
intent to commit a crime ....
Id., 284 Md. at 599 n.12, 399 A.2d at 584.
[emphasis added]
In Pouncey, the Court embraced the
dicta and logic of Langworthy. Again in a
footnote the court provided that:
Since Langworthy, the [statute
directed to the insanity defense]
has been recodified without change.
We see no reason to interpret the
recodified statute any differently,
especially in light of the maxim that
readoption of statutory language
by the legislature without change is
presumed to have incorporated
prior judicial interpretations of
that language ....
Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. at 268 n.2, 465
A.2d at 478.
The court also stated, as in Langworthy,
that the reference to "not guilty by rea;
son of insanity" is a holdover from common law concepts, id., and also provided:
26-The Law Forum/FaU, I984

that a finding of insanity is not tantamount to an absence of mens rea
or inconsistent with a general in~
tent to commit a crime. In drowning her child, the appellant specifi~
cally intended to kill him, and while
her successful insanity defense
means that she is not criminally
responsible for her conduct, that
determination merely relieves her
of liability for punishment under
the criminal law.
Id., 297 Md. at 269, 465 A.2d at 478.
Three conclusions can be drawn from
the court's opinion. The first is that the
insanity statute does not necessarily ad~
dress criminal intent. Secondly, the ver~
dict of "not guilty by reason of insanity"
is a mere holdover of common law concepts and probably no longer recognized
within Maryland. 2 Finally, one who is
found guilty and insane is relieved of1ia~
bility for punishment under the criminal
law.
Although the court seems content
with the rationale in support of the first
conclusion, the issue whether the statute
addresses general criminal intent is
complex. For instance, it is difficult to
see how the first prong of the test-that
a defendant is not responsible for crimi~
nal conduct if he lacks substantial capa~
city to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct-is not necessarily directed to
criminal intent. See Johnson v. State, 292
Md. 405, 425 n. 10,439 A.2d 542,554
(1982). Indeed the Court of Special Ap~
peals has twice ruled that it is. Langworthy v. State, 39 Md. App. 559, 561,
387 A.2d 634 (1978), rev'd., 284 Md.
588, 399 A.2d 578 (1979); Gardner v.
State, 41 Md. App. 186, 195,396 A.2d
303, aff'd, 286 Md. 520,408A.2d 1317
(1979). In Pouncey, the defendant was
charged with murder in the first degree,
a specific intent crime. In such a crime,
the prosecution in Maryland must prove
that the intentional killing of another
was willful, deliberate and premeditated,
and also without justification, excuse or
mitigation. See Md. Opinion No. 82~
844 (to be published at 67 Op. Att'y
Gen. 292)(filed Dec. 23, 1982). It is
hard to imagine how a finding of specific
intent could be maintained even under
the second prong-that a defendant is
not responsible if he lacks substantial
capacity to conform conduct to the re~
quirements of law-when one is found
insane. If one lacks substantial capacity
to conform to the conduct proscribed
by law and is therefore insane, then one
surely is not without excuse for acts
committed and should be absolved of
murder in the first degree. Again, the

court failed to address this issue.
The second conclusion of the court,
that the insanity defense is merely a
holdover from the common law and
should be ignored, can be accepted if one
agrees with the court's first conclusion.
However, in light of the above discussion,
the court's first conclusion, and thus the
second, appears suspect.
The third conclusion, that a verdict of
guilty and insane means that one is not
criminally responsible and therefore not
subject to punishment is without merit.
As the defendant in Pouncey points out, a
guilty verdict burdens the defendant
with a record of criminal conviction. The
defendant in such a circumstance is prohibited from voting, from serving on a
jury, from acquiring various government
licenses or contracts and also will be inhibited from acquiring future employment opportunities. Id., 297 Md. at 269,
465 A.2d at 478. Although one does not
spend time in the jail house under such a
verdict, these are real sanctions and are
designed to be punitive.
The verdict of guilty and insane in
Maryland is not unique with Pouncey.
However, the verdict raises questions of
due process which the court has yet to
address. Although the verdict is not a
new one, it can hardly be considered
established until such questions are con~
side red and answered. In the interim, a
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
would appear to be a proper verdict,
where the state could prove the actus reus
but has failed to prove the defendant
sane when the defendant successfully interposes the plea of insanity.
by James Poulos
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Notes
I Title 12 of the Health-General Article has
been amended in 1984. The test for insanity
remains the same, but the "insanity" verdict is now called the "criminal responsibility" verdict. The test is now codified at
MD. HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN. §12-108(a)
(1984).
2 This conclusion mis further supported by
the legislature's change of language from
"insanity" to "Criminal responsibility"
in the new statute. MD. HEALTH GEN.
CODE ANN. TITLE 12 (1984).

